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Report On Contra Split, U.S. Plans To Derail Nicaraguan
Peace Process
by Deborah Tyroler
Category/Department: General
Published: Wednesday, May 11, 1988
[The following report was prepared by Peter Dale Scott, who returned from Nicaragua on May 8
after observing in an unofficial capacity the April 28-30 round of the ceasefire talks in Managua.
Scott traveled to Nicaragua under the auspices of the Institute for the Practice of Nonviolence, San
Francisco, Calif.] The recent dismissal of several contra military commanders and their expulsion
from Honduras reflects a more serious political split inside contra ranks than did past squabbles
over personalities and alleged corruption. This division derives from the determination of contra
military chief Enrique Bermudez, backed by Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams, to prevent
the current cease-fire in Nicaragua, due to expire on May 30, from becoming permanent. The most
recent actions of Bermudez and Abrams have made clear their opposition to the definitive ceasefire envisaged by the Sapoa agreement of March 23. And there are disturbing indications that
the US administration will seek to use the imminent breakdown of the peace negotiations as a
pretext to secure congressional support for military aid. The Hardening of the Contra Position Field
commander Walter Calderon Lopez, known as Tono, one of the ousted contra leaders who arrived
in Miami May 6, explained to the press that he had joined the contra revolt against Bermudez'
direction of the military effort because Bermudez was trying to undermine the cease-fire agreement
signed by the Nicaraguan government and contras last March 23 in Sapoa, Nicaragua. Tono is a
good witness to attest to the recent hardening of the contra negotiating position, which was evident
at the last round of talks held in Managua April 28 to April 30. Tono was one of the two contra
military leaders in the contra delegation which signed the Sapoa agreements. The response of
Bermudez was to remove the two from the delegations to succeeding rounds of talks, and ultimately
from their positions as contra commanders. [Ed note: According to the Washington Post (reported
in the San Francisco Chronicle, 05/10/88, p. A14), the other leader, Diogenes Hernandez Membreno,
called Fernando, escaped arrest and deportation by Honduran authorities. Between 1,500 and 3,000
of his troops "have blockaded themselves in their Honduran base camp and are refusing to take
orders from the established rebel leadership...The rebellious troops are demanding the resignation
of Enrique Bermudez, the US-backed leader of the contras and of the high command appointed by
him, according to rebel sources."] Observers (including myself) at the April 28-30 round of peace
talks noted that the contra demands at these talks now seem limited to guarantees that their troops
could be relocated, without having to disarm, in zones over which they could exercise considerable
control. The government insisted on linking such technical arrangements, or modus operandi, to
the permanent cease-fire envisaged by the Sapoa agreement, which the contras were not willing
to discuss at this time. As a result the talks were deadlocked. Negotiators were not even able to
decide when or where to hold the next round of talks, which may be the last before the cease-fire
ends. The hopes for peace were not totally eclipsed. A smaller commission managed during the
course of the talks to reduce the conflicting proposals of the two sides to a common agenda of 32
points, on which agreement, according to the government, has now been reached on 15. But it
seemed clear from the proposals put forward that the reconstituted contra delegation, with two
hand-picked Bermudez representatives in place of those who signed at Sapoa, were now willing to
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discuss only the modus operandi of relocating their troops in cease-fire zones, without reference
to the government's insistence on agreement for these troops' eventual integration into civilian
life. Particularly disheartening was the refusal of the contra delegation to agree to a temporary
extension of the existing cease-fire for 30 days, even in the absence of agreement for the next round
of talks. One has the impression that the contras no longer are willing, as they were at Sapoa, to take
definitive steps that might convert the existing military conflict into a political one. The implacable
opposition of Bermudez to de-militarizing the conflict was also revealed by his order of April 17 to
contra field commanders to desist from attending peace discussions (encuentros) which saw contra
and Sandinista commanders in the war zones meeting, and working out local cease-fire agreements,
in the presence of members of the local reconciliation commissions. American observers of one
of these encuentros told me that the war-weariness and joy at reconciliation on both sides was
unanimous. Bermudez' fear of these encuentros seems to have been motivated by their success.
Responsibility of US administration The US administration appears to be directly responsible for
the contras' change in political direction and in personnel. Shortly before the talks there were major
disagreements between the contras' military and civilian leaders over the position to be taken in
negotiations (New York Times, 04/26/88, p. A8). Elliott Abrams injected himself into the contra
leadership quarrel when it looked as if Bermudez' dominance might be successfully challenged.
Abrams met with the contra delegation in Miami before they traveled to Managua armed with a
hardened position. Perhaps even more important has been the clear encouragement for continued
conflict conveyed by the administration's flagrant abuse of the spirit and letter of the legislation
authorizing humanitarian aid for the contras. That the law has been broken seems unambiguous.
H.J. Res. 523 stated that: "The assistance and support for which this joint resolution provides
shall be administered consistent with the Sapoa Agreement. No authority contained in this joint
resolution is intended to be exercised in any manner that might be determined by the Verification
Commission established by the Sapoa Agreement to be inconsistent with that Agreement or any
subsequent agreement between the Government of Nicaragua and the Nicaraguan democratic
resistance." The relevant section of the Sapoa Agreement is the following: "4. In order to guarantee
food and basic supplies to the irregular forces, only humanitarian aid shall be sought and accepted,
in accordance with Numeral 5 of the Esquipulas II Accords, and it shall be channeled through
neutral organizations." The so-called humanitarian aid has been distributed under the auspices
of USAID, using its traditional affiliates in Honduras, including a mysterious small airline which
has understandably been suspected of having a background like those used by the CIA in the
past. This evasion of the requirement for neutral organizations was protested in a letter of April
25 to Secretary of State George Shultz from one of the two members of the Sapoa Agreement's
Verification Commission, Joao Baena Soares, Secretary General of the Organization of American
States. (The other Commission member is Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo.) Baena Soares made
it unambiguously clear that in his view the actions taken by USAID did not fall within the type of
humanitarian aid provision envisaged by the Congressional Resolution, the Sapoa Agreement, or
Esquipulas II (the regional peace plan signed in August 1987). Since then, the violation of the US
law has become even more flagrant. In Managua I spoke at length with a BBC television newsman
who had personally filmed the arrival in Honduras of C-130 planes from Fort Bragg carrying US
military uniforms and boots. The cargo was trucked to the same warehouses from which food was
being distributed to the contras. US personnel explained that the uniforms and boots were being
supplied under the humanitarian aid bill, even though the Esquipulas Accords to which the Sapoa
Agreement refers states explicitly that the only equipment to be supplied from outside powers will
be for the purposes of relocation. The substantive aid thus channeled to the contras to improve
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their military situation is not nearly as important as the message that (as Reagan has frequently
reiterated) the administration's support for the contras' military objectives has not been dampened
by the efforts at Esquipulas and Sapoa to achieve peace. What does the administration hope to
achieve by this foot-dragging and obstructionism? There are informed reports that the favored
scenario is as follows: wait out the current cease-fire until it ends on May 30; while charging the
Nicaraguan government with failure to reach agreement on aid delivery as an excuse, begin to drop
US aid to contras in the Nicaraguan war zones by US airlift. Should the Nicaraguan government
then respond to this violation of their air space by shooting down a "humanitarian aid" airplane, the
administration would hope to have found the pretext to goad Congress into resuming military aid.
There are indications that this scenario has been carefully planned for. In the recent Congressional
maneuvers over contra aid, the administration pressed for measures giving the president the
power to expedite any subsequent aid request in the next 12 months. Although this proposal from
Democratic Senator Boren was not acted on, House Speaker Jim Wright guaranteed an expedited
aid procedure as part of the humanitarian aid package. Wright pledged in writing that if the ceasefire were to break down and the president determined that the Nicaraguan government was at
fault, the president would be guaranteed that his aid proposal would proceed to the House floor
within ten days. Meanwhile in Managua on April 28 the contra delegation began by claiming that
their troops in the field were suffering and needed supplies immediately. When the Nicaraguan
government responded by offering to allow the International Red Cross to deliver US aid on an
interim basis, the contras rejected the offer. The latter claimed that the Red Cross had worked too
closely with the Sandinista government in the past. This led one contra leader to admit in a press
conference that their troops were not really suffering after all. In the midst of all this intrigue, House
Speaker Wright may find that his expedited aid pledge is a ticking time bomb. The responsibility
of Congress What is conspicuously absent at this moment is a clear indication that Congress will
protest the administration's abuse of its legislative provisions and intent. Over the years the contras
have learned that, notwithstanding congressional limitations and prohibitions, the administration
would continue its support while Congress turned a blind eye. The Iran-contra affair might have
seemed to signal an end to that era; the report of the two Select Committees investigating the affair
condemned what they called "a flagrant violation of the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution,"
and reaffirmed that "There is no place in Government for law breakers" (Report, pages 18-19). It
was in the context of the Iran-contra hearings, and indications that Congress would act to curb
administration excesses in support of their ill-starred contra policy, that the presidents of the
Central American nations were emboldened to sign the Esquipulas Agreements last August. The
peace process thus launched seems now to be endangered, if Congress by its inaction reinforces
the message of Elliott Abrams to the contras that in fact nothing has changed. Conclusions The
administration, by the personal efforts of Elliot Abrams, and by its flagrant evasion of the spirit and
the letter of the Joint Resolution authorizing humanitarian aid, has strengthened the hand of the
hard-liners in the contra military leadership, who clearly do not wish the Sapoa agreement ceasefire to be extended, and who have fired the contra military commanders who signed the agreement
for a temporary cease-fire on March 23. What is now urgently needed is congressional action to
make it clear to the contras that they cannot by intransigence in the peace talks achieve an automatic
resumption of US military aid, that the "advice" of Elliott Abrams does not speak for the entire US
government, and that Congress will not as in the past turn a blind eye while legislative restrictions
on its aid are evaded by the administration.
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